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I.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is a breach of contract action seeking payment of adjusted rents for the 201 0 Rent
Adjustment Period 1 now due and owing under the terms and conditions of Section 1.3(b) of the
parties' Ground Lease Agreement because the amount of such disputed and outstanding rents has
been determined by the Honorable Mitchell \V. Brown in his November 26, 2012 Declaratory
Judgment. (R Vol. I, pp. 15-17).

B.

Course of Proceedings.

The Plaintiff/Respondent, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Center, LLC
("PMC'), filed its Complaint against the Defendants/Appellants, Quail Ridge Medical Investors,
LLC ("Quail Ridge") and its principal owner and personal guarantor, Forrest Preston ("Preston") on

1

In Bannock County Case No CV-2010-0002724-0C [(currently under advisement with this

Court as Supreme Court Docket No. 40566-2012], the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown found, among other
things, that Pocatello Hospital, LLC dba PortneufMedical Center, LLC, and Quail Ridge Medical
Investors, LLC, are successors in interest to a Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 1983. (R Vol.
1, p. 46,

at~

7). Judge Brown also found that this Ground Lease Agreement called for rent to be adjusted

every three years, with one of those three year adjustment periods to commence on February 1, 2010. (R
Vol. 1, pp. 51-52, at ~8). Judge Brown ultimately declared in that action the amount of rent that should
have been paid during this rent adjustment period that should have commenced on February 1, 2010 (R
Vol. 1, p. 58,

at~

45), which period is referred to in this brief for convenience as the "2010 Rent

Adjustment Period." This prior action has been referred to by Appellants as PMC I and, therefore, for
convenience will be identified as the same in the Respondent Brief.
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December 12, 2012. (R Vol. I, pp. 9-17). Quail Ridge and Preston (collectively referred to
hereinafter as "Quail-Preston") filed a Joint Answer and Jury Demand on

29,

3. (R Vol.

I, pp. 20-24).
On or about February 7, 2012, Quail-Preston filed their Motion to Stay, requesting that the
district court stay this proceeding while PJ:fC I proceeded on appeal. (R Vol. I, pp. 25-33). PMC
timely resisted Quail-Preston's Motion to Stay (R Vol. I, pp. 34-72) and the district court ultimately
held a hearing on this issue on March 4, 2013. (Tr Hr'g on March 4, 2013 2, pp. 8-22). At the
conclusion of this March 4, 2013 hearing, the Honorable Robert C. Naftz entered an order on the
record staying the proceeding and requiring Quail-Preston to post a bond in the amount set out in
Judge Brown's Amended Declaratory Judgment entered in Plv!C I during the pendency of the stay
pursuant to the court's authority under I.R.C.P. 60(b). (R Vol.l, p. 4, 87-89 3) (Tr Hr"g on March 4,

2

Respondent recognizes that l.A.P. 35(3) provides that ·'references to the reporter's transcript

shall be made by the designation 'Tr' followed by the volume .... " In this case, however, a review of the
reporter's transcripts shows that the reporter has identified all volumes as "Volume One of One'' with the
page numbers restarting in each new volume. As such, for clarity within the Respondent Brief, the
reporter's transcripts are being referred to by the hearing date in substitution for the volume that
otherwise would have been referenced.
3

Although the district court prepared a Minute Entry and Order, file stamped March 7, 2013,

which detailed the results of the March 4, 2013 hearing, a review of the Clerk Record on Appeal does not
show that this document was lodged with the Clerk of Court. This document, was, however, served on
the counsel for the parties to this action. As such, it was attached as an Exhibit in PMC's Motion to
Compel and, therefore, can be found in the Clerk's record on Appeal, at pp. 87-89.
Respondent Brief
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2013, pp. 20:17- 22:8).

lUl\JU.".H

Quail-Preston's counsel argued during the hearing that a bond

was unnecessary, Quail-Preston's counsel also conceded during the same hearing that the district
court had authority under I.R.C.P. 60(b) to require a bond under the circumstances of this case and
that such requirement was certainly reasonable and within the court's discretion. (Tr Hr' g on March
4, 2013, pp. 12:24-13:20, 18:11-22).
Despite the concessions made by Quail-Preston's attorney during the hearing acknowledging
that the district court was within its authority and rights to require the posting of a bond during the
pendency of a stay and that such a requirement would be reasonable and further despite the fact that
Judge Naftz entered an order requiring Quail-Preston to post a bond in this action during the
pendency of the stay, Quail-Preston ultimately failed or refused to post a bond in this matter. On
June 13, 2013, PM C filed a Motion to Compel and supporting documents, requesting that the district
court either enter a new order requiring Quail-Preston to immediately post a bond or, in the
alternative, for the district court to lift the previous stay and allow this matter to proceed. (R Vol.
1, p. 79-96). A hearing on PMC's Motion to Compel was held on July 8, 2013. (Tr Hr'g on July
8, 2013, pp. 8:1- 14:2). At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge Naftz granted PMC's motion to
compel and ordered that Quail-Preston post the bond previously ordered by 5:00p.m. on July 22,
2013, or the stay in this matter would be automatically lifted. (Tr Hr'g on July 8, 2013, pp. 12:2413:15). Judge Naftz also awarded on the record PMC's attorney fees for having to bring the motion
to compel. On July 11, 2013, Judge Naftz entered a Minute Entry and Order consistent with his
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ruling from the bench. (R

1, pp. 100-101 ). Once again, despite having been given additional

time to do so, Quail-Preston failed or refused to post

bond ordered by Judge

As a result,

the stay in this matter was automatically lifted after 5:00p.m. on July 22, 2013, after Quail-Preston
failed to timely post the court ordered bond.
On September 5, 2013, PMC filed its Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting
documents. (R Vol. 1, pp. 102-200). Quail-Preston filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
on September 23, 2013. (R Vol. 1, pp. 331). The district court heard oral arguments on the parties'
cross motions for summary judgment on October 21,2013. (Tr Hr'g on October 21,2013, pp. 8:147:21). At the conclusion of oral argument, Judge Naftz granted on the record PMC's Motion for
Summary Judgment and denied on the record Quail-Preston's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment.
(Tr Hr'g on October 21, 2013, pp. 44:21 - 47:6). On October 22, 2013, Judge Naftz signed a
Judgment consistent with his earlier ruling on the record and entered the Judgment on October 23,
2013. (R Vol. 1, pp. 338-39).
On November6, 2013, Quail-Preston timely appealed the0ctober23, 2013 Judgment, which
appeal was filed with the district court on November 7, 2013. (R Vol. 1, pp. 394-397). Also on
November 6, 2013, PMC timely filed its Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees accompanied by a
Memorandum of Costs and Attorney's Fees. (R Vol. 1, pp. 340-393). Quail-Preston opposed
PMC's Motion for Costs and Attorney Fees (R Vol. 1, pp. 403-410). The district court heard oral
arguments on this issue on December 16,2013 and took the matter under advisement. (Tr Hr'g on
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3, pp. 8:1 - 17: 17). On January 7, 2014, Judge Naftz entered an Order Regarding

December 16,

Attorney Fees, wherein he granted PMC, as the prevailing party to the action, costs and attorneys
fees in the total sum of$16,830.93. (R Vol. 1, pp. 413-419). On that same date, the district court
entered a Final Judgment in favor ofPMC in the amount of$416,812.60, plus interest of$45,221.30
for a total of$462,033.80, plus an award of attorneys fees and costs in the amount of$16,830.93.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 420-21). This Final Judgment was recorded by the clerk of court on January 8, 2014.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 420-21).
C.

Statement of Facts.

This is a breach of contract action seeking payment of adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent
Adjustment Period. (R VoL 1, pp. 9-17). It is undisputed in this case that the parties to this action
are governed by and subject to the terms and conditions of a Ground Lease Agreement dated January
1983 ("Lease Agreement"). (R Vol. I, pp. 46).
This case, however, is not the first action between these parties with respect to the Lease
Agreement. In Bannock County Case No. CV-2010-2724-0C- the action which Quail-Preston
identifies in their Appellant's Brief as p;ttC I

PMC ultimately brought claims against Quail Ridge

for breach of contract and declaratory judgment. (R VoL I, pp. 255-263). A general review of
PMC's pleadings in that prior action demonstrates that PMC's breach of contract claim was based
upon the fact that Quail Ridge refused to pay adjusted rents to PMC after PMC had given it an
appraisal and made a demand for increased rent payment. (R Vol. I, pp. 255-263). Nowhere in that
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prior action

PMC ever allege that the disputed rents had ever been properly declared by an

arbitrator or by a court of competent jurisdiction.
It became clear. however, through the pretrial motion stage of P!v!C I that Judge Brown was

reading the Lease Agreement so as to require the rent adjustment to take place before the additional
rent amount would actually be due. In other words, Judge Brown interpreted the Lease Agreement
such that Quail Ridge was not obligated to pay adjusted rents until after such had been properly
declared by an arbitrator or by a court of competent jurisdiction. It also became clear that Judge
Brown was interpreting the Lease Agreement such that Quail Ridge was not obligated under the
terms of that agreement to voluntarily participate in the rent adjustment process as had been alleged
and complained ofby PMC. (R VoL I, p. 273-277 4). Thus, when Quail Ridge moved for directed
verdict on PMC's breach of contract claim at the conclusion ofPMC's evidence in PA1C /,counsel
for PMC did not resist Quail Ridge's motion because it was apparent that the breach of contract
claim was not yet ripe-the condition precedent, the adjustment of the rent amount, had not yet taken
place. (R Vol. I, p. 274-276). Note that evidence was presented at trial that Quail Ridge did not
voluntarily participate in the rent adjustment process after it had been presented with a valid

4

Judge Brown clearly outlines the development of this contract interpretation within the

Discussion section of his Order on Form of Judgment. A review of this section of Judge Brown's Order
on Form of Judgment demonstrates that Judge Brown was of the opinion that a breach of contract claim
against Quail Ridge was not yet ripe because Quail Ridge was not obligated to pay adjusted rents until
such had been properly declared, in this case by the court, nor was Quail Ridge obligated under the Lease
Agreement to voluntarily participate in the rent adjustment process.
Respondent Brief
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appraisal of the leased ground; however, PMC's counsel understood that the result of the trial would
be that Judge Brown would make

determination of the amount

rent that was due, past and

present, and that upon making that determination the amounts would be immediately due to be paid
by Quail. Judge Brown has made it clear that, by his literal reading of the lease agreement, the
increased amount of lease payment only became due after the determination, as stated in his Order
on Form of Judgment:
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that •·the party indebted shall,
promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected
by the adjustment." Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the
determination has been made as contemplated under the Ground Lease
Agreement, the Ground Lease Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the
balance due under the Ground Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease
Agreement does not define the term prompt tor purposes of the parties'
agreement, a failure to pay this amount in a reasonable time certainly would
give rise to an action for breach of contract.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 275) (emphasis added). It is undisputed in this case that Quail-Preston has not paid
the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment period even though such had been determined by
Judge Brown in his Amended Declaratory Judgment as currently due and owing to PMC. Based
upon this failure to pay, PMC filed this current breach of contract action against both Quail Ridge
and Preston.

II.

ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL:

ATTORL~EY

FEES ON APPEAL

PMC asserts that it is entitled to attorney fees and costs in the event it prevails on this appeal.
PMC would continue to be the overall prevailing party in this litigation if the district court is upheld
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on appeaL
cnr,n.rr•<"H

is set

fees and costs

more fully

the Respondent's Arguments infra, PMC is entitled to

this action pursuant to Sections 1 120(3) of the Idaho Code; pursuant to

Rule 41 of the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure; and, pursuant to Section 10.3 of the parties'
Lease Agreement.

III.

ARGUMENT

A.

Introduction

Quail-Preston's primary argument in this case is that PMC 's current breach of contract claim
should be barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because PMC brought
a breach of contract action against Quail Ridge in the prior action, herein identified as PlvlC I. QuailPreston's arguments, however, miss the mark because they focus upon the wrong set of facts.
The set of facts and legal basis giving rise to the current breach of contract claim against the
Defendants-Appellants, Quail-Preston, is best summarized and detailed by the judge presiding over
Plvfl I, the Honorable Mitchell W. Brown. In his Order on Form of Judgment, Judge Brown stated

the following concerning the impact his Declaratory Judgment would have upon the parties and the
possibility of a future breach of contract claim relating to the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period for which
he had declared adjusted rents:
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party indebted shall,
promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the period affected
by the adjustment." Ground Lease Agreement, p. 3, § 1.3(b). Now that the
determination has been made as contemplated under the Ground Lease
Agreement, the Ground Lease Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the
balance due under the Ground Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease
Respondent Brief
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Agreement does not define the term prompt for purposes of the parties'
agreement, a failure to pav this amount in a reasonable time certainly would
give rise to an action for breach of contract.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 275) (emphasis added). So the natural question becomes, why would Judge Brown
grant a directed verdict against PMC on the first breach of contract claim and then state in his final
order that Quail Ridge will have an action for breach of contract if Quail Ridge fails to pay to PM C
in a reasonable time the adjusted 2010 rents he declared due and owing? The answer to that question
is simple: Judge Brown understood that the breach of contract claim was not ripe until after his
declaratory judgment established the amount that was due. In his order Judge Brown made it clear
that PMC would have the right to pursue the breach of contract claim should Quail Ridge fail in its
obligations to pay within a reasonable amount of time such rents declared by him as due and owing
for the 2010 Rent Adjusted Period.
Quail-Preston in their arguments before the district court below and now before this Court
completely ignore the above language from Judge Brown. The simple fact is that Quail did not meet
the obligations for rent payment that had been determined by the court and, as a result, the current
breach of contract claim was brought against them. Judge Naftz was, however, provided a copy of
Judge Brown's Order on Form of Judgment and it is clear from his decisions that Judge Naftz
recognized the above-outlined facts and understood that Judge Brown's order gave rise to a new
breach of contract action. Judge N aftz further correctly understood that there were no genuine issues
of material fact on this issue.
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As will be discussed more thoroughly below, Judge Naftz' rejection of Quail-Preston·s
defenses of res judicata and collateral estoppel was warranted and consistent with the law because:
(1) ripeness has long been recognized in Idaho and within the Restatement (Second) of Judgments
as an exception to the these legal doctrines; (2) Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment in PMC I and
Quail-Preston's failure to promptly pay the 201 0 adjusted rents in a reasonab1e time thereafter created
a change of circumstances which has also been recognized by Idaho and the Restatement (Second)
of Judgments as an exception to these legal doctrines; or (3) Judge Brown reserved to PMC in his
Order on Form of Judgment the right to pursue a breach of contract action against Quail Ridge
should it fail to promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents declared by him as now due and owing.
Section 26( 1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments recognizes that when the first court in
an action between the parties reserves the right to a plaintiff to pursue a second action, res judicata
and collateral estoppel do not act as a bar to the second action by the plaintiff.
Any of the above-identified legal exceptions gave Judge Naftz the right to find that PMC s
breach of contract claim against Quail-Preston was not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel. In this case, all three exceptions are satisfied. Because there were no genuine
issues of material fact with regard to PMC's breach of contract claim, Judge Naftz appropriately
granted summary judgment in this case. Furthermore, because Judge Naftz appropriately granted
summary judgment in favor ofPMC, it is the prevailing party below and is entitled to the costs and
attorneys fees awarded by Judge Naftz.
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B.

Standard of review

Quail-Preston accurately

standard of review within the Appellant Brief. Simply

put, if there were no genuine issues of any material fact after the district court weighed all evidence
in favor of the non-moving parties on the cross-motions for summary judgment, then the district
court's findings of fact must not be disturbed on appeal. Similarly, if the district court correctly
stated the law, the district court's conclusions oflaw should also stand on appeal.
C.

Ripeness has long been recognized in Idaho and within the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments as an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and
Collateral Estoppel.

Idaho courts have long recognized ripeness as a limitation on the doctrine of res judicata.
See Gaige v. CityofBoise, 91 Idaho 481,485,425 P.2d 52,56 (1967) (finding that even though the
specific City Code section had been raised in the prior action, the second action was not barred by
the doctrine of res judicata because the subject of the controversy in the prior action was not ripe for
adjudication where the City had not yet attempted to enforce that section of the City Code); see also
Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 754,663 P.2d 287,290 (1983)(finding that "because
facts occurred subsequent to the first trial that triggered the filing of the second suit," the issue was
not ripe for trial in the first case); and, Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254,257-59,668 P.2d 130, 133-35
(Idaho Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that one of the limits of res judicata recognized by the Idaho
Supreme Court is ·'where matters raised in the second litigation were not ripe for adjudication in the
prior action.").
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Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, cited often with approval by this Court, 5
recognizes ripeness as an exception to the doctrines of res judicata

collateral estoppel.

Specifically, Section 20(2) of the Restatement provides the following guidance in this regard:
(2)

A valid and final personal judgment for the defendant, which rests on
the prematurity of the action or on the plaintiffs failure to satisfY a
precondition to the suit, does not bar another action by the plaintiff
instituted after the claim has matured or the precondition has been
satisfied, unless a second action is precluded by operation of the
substantive law.

Restatement (Second) ofJudgements § 20, Judgments for Defendant-~ Exception to the General Rule
of Bar, at (2) (emphasis added).

It is clear from the above language that the drafters of the Restatement understood that where
a claim in the first action was premature. a second action is not barred after the claim has matured
simply because the first action had been brought. This Court should recognize that Quail-Preston's
arguments in this case are directly contrary to this law because they ignore the obvious fact that the
amount due was not determined yet when the breach of contract claim was dismissed and, therefore,
that such claim was not ripe for determination. Under these circumstances, the doctrine of res
judicata simply does not apply once the claim becomes ripe for a determination.

5

See, e.g. Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 119 Idaho 146, 804 P.2d 319 (1990) (recognizing

that Restatement (Second) of Judgments had been cited to and reviewed often by the Idaho Supreme
Court over the years); see also Houser v. Southern Idaho Pipe & Steel, Inc., 103 Idaho 441, 649 P .2d
1197 ( 1982) (citing with approval to Comment a to section 61 ); and, Shield v "lvforton Chemical Co., 95
Idaho 674, 518 P.2d 857 (1974) (adopting comment k to Section 402A).
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That

drafters ofthe Restatement understood this reality is best illustrated in the comments

to this Section. Specifically, Illustration 5 to Section 20 gives the following particularly insightful
example of what the commentators were contemplating when they drafted the above exception:

Illustration:
5.

On January 1, 1972, A sues B alleging that in consideration of payment of
S 100 by A, B agreed to deliver certain goods to A, and that B has failed to
deliver the goods. At the trial it appears that the goods were to be delivered
on June 1, 1972. The court directs verdict forB and judgment is given on the
verdict for B. A is not precluded from maintaining an action for breach ofthe
contract after June 1. 1982. if B has failed to deliver the goods on or before
that day.

!d., at Illustration 5 (emphasis added). This Court should note that the district court in this
illustration directed verdict in favor of the defendant because the evidence at trial demonstrated that
the defendant had no obligation to act under those facts because delivery was not yet due. Yet,
despite the fact that directed verdict had been given on the breach of contract claim in this
illustration, the commentators still recognized in that example that the plaintiff is not barred from
bringing a second action against that defendant for breach of contract should the defendant fail to
deliver the goods on or before the contractual date had passed. Notably, there is nothing within this
illustration that states that counsel for A, the plaintiff, was required to request in response to the
motion for directed verdict for the court to bifurcate the trial in order to preserve the right to bring
a breach of contract claim once the delivery date had passed without the subsequent delivery.
Similarly in this case, directed verdict was given at trial once it was determined by Judge
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Brown that Quail Ridge was under no contractual obligation to pay adjusted rents until after such
rents had been determined by an arbitrator or a court of competent jurisdiction. There was no dispute
that such had not occurred as of the time of trial. As such, like in the example above, the defendant
was not required to act until the condition precedent had been satisfied. In this case, the condition
precedent was a determination of the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period.
Yet, just like in the commentator's illustration above, once that condition precedent had been
satisfied, the defendant, Quail Ridge, was under an obligation to act promptly. Once the defendant
failed to act promptly, the plaintiff, P:N1C, was entitled to bring its breach of contract claim because
the claim had then become ripe for determination. As in Illustration 5 above, PMC is not barred
from brining this second action once Quail Ridge failed to perform as required under the contract.
The mere fact that PMC brought a premature breach of contract action in P1\I!C I is not a bar to the
second action which has now become mature and ripe for determination by a court.
The commentators to Section 20(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provide the
rationale for this exception:
A determination by the court that the plaintiff has no enforceable claim
because the action is premature, or because he has failed to satisfy a
precondition to suit, is not a determination that he may not have an
enforceable claim thereafter, and does not preclude him from maintaining an
action when the claim has become enforceable.
!d., at Comment k.
The fact that this rationale applies in the case at hand is best demonstrated by Judge Brown's
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statements in his Order on Form of Judgment. Judge Brown made it clear that his reasoning for
granting directed verdict on the breach of contract claim in P1WC I is because PMC's breach
contract claim was not yet ripe for determination:
However, had Plaintiff opposed Quail Ridge [sic] Motion for Directed
Verdict on Plaintiffs Breach of Contract Claim, the Court would have been
constrained to grant the motion because there was no evidence in the trial
record to support a claim that Quail Ridge was in breach of contract. Rather,
Quail Ridge had paid rent each month in the original amount of$9,562.50.
As such, there was no evidence that Quail Ridge was in violation or
had breached the terms ofthe Ground Lease Agreement. Similarly, the Court
would have also concluded, had the Court been asked to make findings of
fact and conclusions of law on this issue, that Quail Ridge had not violated
the Ground Lease Agreement in failing to cooperate in the rent adjustment
provisions .... There has been no breach established to the Court as of the
time of trial in this matter.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 273-77) (citations omitted). The fact that Judge Brown understood that this breach
of contract claim would later be ripe after he declared the 2010 adjusted rents is demonstrated by his
language found later in his Order on Form of Judgment:
The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party
indebted shalL promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the
period affected by the adjustment." Now that the determination has been
made as contemplated under the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground Lease
Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the balance due under the Ground
Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease Agreement does not define
the term prompt for purposes of the parties· agreement, a failure to pay this
amount in a reasonable time certainly would give rise to an action for breach
of contract.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 273-77) {citations omitted) {emphasis added) .
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facts outlined

Judge Brown in his Order on Form of Judgment demonstrate that the

present case is no different than the commentators' Illustration No.5. This is simply a case where
PMC's breach of contract claim in P1UC I was not yet mature or where there was a failure of a
condition precedent before the suit could be brought. Directed verdict in favor of the defendant,
Quail Ridge, under these circumstances was not fatal to PMC' s ability to bring a second action after
the claim had become mature or after the condition precedent (i.e., Judge Brown's declaration ofthe
2010 adjusted rents) had been satisfied.
That Judge Naftz understood in the second action that the claim had now become mature or
ripe for determination is demonstrated by his findings after hearing on the cross-motion for summary
judgment:
The Court's decision in this matter is to grant PMC Summary
Judgment because of the because there is no genuine issue of material fact
that the Court can find. By failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent from the
2010 rent adjustment period determined by Judge Brown, Quail Ridge
breached its obligations under the ground lease agreement.
Further, summary judgment from PMC is appropriate against Forest
Preston because there is no genuine issue of material fact that by failing to
pay Quail Ridge's outstanding obligations under the ground lease, Mr.
Preston is in breach of his obligation as a personal guarantee.
It is clear to me the action is ripe for summary judgment, and I am

going to grant summary judgment in favor of the Plaintiff. I'm going to deny
the cross motion for summary judgment, obviously, because of my ruling
here today.
(T r Hr' g on October 21, 2013, pp. 46:6- 47 :6) (emphasis added). The above-language demonstrates
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Judge Naftz recognized that an action that was not ripe in the prior action before Judge Brown
was now "ripe for summary judgment. There was no genuine issue of material

on the

of

the breach of contract. As such, Judge Naftz granted summary judgment. His refusal to apply the
doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel under these circumstances was both consistent with
Idaho case law as well as consistent with Section 20(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.
This case falls within one of the clear exceptions to the bar that otherwise would have applied. As
such, Judge Naftz's rulings and judgment should be affirmed on this appeal.
D.

Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment in P1l1C I and Quail-Preston's failure to
promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents in a reasonable time thereafter created a
change in circumstances which has also been recognized by Idaho and the
Restatement (Second) of Judgments as an exception to the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel.

While the section supra demonstrates that ripeness is a long recognized exception to the bar
of res judicata and collateral estoppel, it is not the only exception that has been recognized by the
Idaho Supreme Court or by the Restatement (Second) of Judgements. In Duthie v. Levt·iston Gun
Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983), the Idaho Supreme Court recognized that the doctrine

of res judicata does not bar an action where '·facts occurred subsequent to the first trial that triggered
the filing of the second suit."6 The Idaho Supreme Court's recognition in Duthie that a change in

6

Although Quail-Preston argue that the Duthie Court's opinion is "bad law" and, therefore,

requests this Court to take this opportunity to overturn it, Quail-Preston is misguided. As is discussed in
detail in the arguments in Section C of Respondent Brief infra, the law recognized by the Court in Duthie
is consistent with the law in this area as outlined in Restatement (Second) of Judgments. This
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be an exception to the doctrines of res judicata and coilateral estoppel is
consistent

the law in this area as outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments.

Specifically, Comment f of Section 24 provides the following guidance of what effect a change of
circumstances may have on the bringing of a new action after a failed prior action:
f. Change of Circumstances. Material operative facts occurring after the
decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in
themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a
transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by
the ilrst.

Restatement has long been recognized by Idaho courts as sound on this area of the law. See Diamond,
119 Idaho at 150,804 P.2d at 323 (recognizing that Restatement (Second) of Judgments had been cited to
and reviewed often by the Idaho Supreme Court over the years).
While it is true that Justice Bistline offered a spirited dissent in that case, this Court will
recognize that Justice Bristline's dissent is not so much an attack on the statement of the law by the
majority with regard to recognized exceptions to the doctrine of res judicata as it is an attack on the
application of those exceptions to the facts of that case. Indeed, Justice Bristline was not amused by the
Defendant-Respondent's ·'self help'· in that case which he found was exactly what it had been prohibited
from doing in the first action. A comparison of those facts to the facts in the case at hand clearly
demonstrates that no such concerns exist in this case. Indeed, this case cannot be more opposite in many
respects. Rather that doing what it had been prohibited from doing in the prior action, in this case PMC
did exactly what the prior district court indicated it should do in the event that Quail Ridge failed to pay
the 2010 adjusted rents; bring a breach of contract action. It is not PMC's wrongdoing that has led to the
present action but rather the wrongdoing of Quail-Preston. Thus, this Court should simply find that
Justice Bristline's dissent is inappostie to the issues before this Court and, therefore is not persuasive nor
helpful to the facts before the Court.
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tut•c:rne:nt (Second) ofJudgments §
Dimensions
General Rule Concerning "Splitting,·· at Comment f.

Purposes ojlvferger or Bar

In this case, this Court should recognize that Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment and
Quail-Preston's subsequent failure to pay the 2010 adjusted rents declared by Judge Brown as then
due and owing comprised a new and separate transaction distinct from the breach of contract claim
raised by PMC in the PlvfC I action. This Court should further recognize that these new set of facts
gave rise to a new and independent breach of contract claim against these defendants.
Such a finding by this Court would certainly be consistent with Judge Brown's statements
in his Order on Form of Judgment, which have already been cited in the section supra. There can
be no doubt from his language in the Order on Form of Judgment that Judge Brown himself
understood his Declaratory Judgment created a new set of facts that were separate and distinct from
those presented to him at trial. There similarly can be no doubt that Judge Brown understood that
this new fact created a new obligation for Quail Ridge to perform under the terms of the parties·
Lease Agreement. Because Quail Ridge was obligated to perform, it also stands to reason that
Preston was required to perform under the terms ofhis Guarantee. Finally, Judge Brown made it
clear in his Order on Form of Judgment that should Quail Ridge fail in its obligation to promptly pay
the 2010 adjusted rents declared by him- and by extension, Preston fail to perform under the terms
of the Guarantee

then a breach of contract action would follow.

Judge Brown pointed this out to Quail Ridge even though he had previously granted Quail
Ridge its motion for directed verdict on PMC's prior breach of contract claim. Why would he do
Respondent Brief
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so? It is reasonable to believe that Judge Brown understood that a new set of facts was now in place
give rise to a new breach of contract claim and he was pointing this out to Quail Ridge

that

in hopes ofthis second action being avoided. Quail-Preston did not give heed to Judge Brown's plan
for how the case would proceed should they fail to pay and this new breach of contract action was
brought by PMC against them for their failure to pay the 2010 adjusted rents declared by Judge
Brown.
The fact that Judge Naftz recognized Judge Brown's declaratory judgment and QuailPreston's failure to pay as a new transaction giving rise to a new breach of contract claim is
illustrated in his findings at the conclusion of argument on the parties' cross-motions for summary
judgment:
I think it's pretty clear that this is an action on breach of contract case.
Judge Brown issued his decision. A new set of facts arose, and based on that,
a breach of contract action was filed.
(Tr Hr'g on October 21,2013, pp. 46:6-10) (emphasis added). Because he recognized that he was
dealing with a change of circumstances from PAtfC I, this Court should affirm Judge Naftz's refusal
to apply the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel under these circumstances. This Court
should find that Judge Naftz' s ruling was consistent with the law previously outlined by this Court
in Duthie as well as the iaw outlined in Comment f of Section 24, Restatement (Second) of
Judgments. Because the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel did not apply to these
changed circumstances, this Court should uphold Judge Naftz's grant of summary judgment. There
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ts no

issue of material fact

this case that Quail Ridge and Preston failed to pay the 2010

adjusted rents declared by Judge Brmvn as currently due and

For these reasons, this Court

should affirm Judge Naftz's decision to grant summary judgment in PMC's favor and his decision
to deny Quail-Preston's cross-motion for summary judgment.
E.

This court should adopt Section 26(1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments and find that where a prior court has expressly reserved the right
of a plaintiff in a first action to pursue a second action, then the second action
is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.

Although the prior two Sections of Respondent Brief each provide this Court with a separate
and independent basis to affirm Judge Naftz's refusal to apply the doctrines of res judicata and
collateral estoppel to the facts of this case, this Court should take this opportunity to adopf Section
26( 1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and find that where a prior court has expressly
reserved to a plaintiff the right to pursue a second action, then the second action is not barred by the
doctrine of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
Quail-Preston maintains in this appeal that PMC was required to bifurcate the earlier trial and
that it should not be allowed to bring a new action. That Judge Brown, who presided over the trial
in P1vfC I, did not agree with this assessment is demonstrated by his Order on Form of Judgment:

7

See Diamond, 119 Idaho at 150, 804 P.2d at 322 (finding that ·'rather than categorically

adopting an entire chapter of the Restatement, this Court has consistently displayed its preference for
selectively examining various sections and comments from the Restatement, and thereafter adopting,
citing favorably, or rejecting the provision, as the occasion warrants). In this case, this Court should find
that this is an appropriate occasion to adopt this limited section of the Restatement.
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The parties' Ground Lease Agreement provides that "the party
indebted shalL promptly after the determination, pay any difference for the
period affected by the adjustment." Now that the determination has been
made as contemplated under the Ground Lease Agreement, the Ground Lease
Agreement requires "prompt" payment of the balance due under the Ground
Lease Agreement. Although the Ground Lease Agreement does not define
the term prompt for purposes of the parties' agreement, a failure to pay this
amount in a reasonable time certainly would give rise to an action for breach
of contract.
(R Vol. 1, pp. 273-77) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). By stating in this last and final Order
that Quail Ridge's failure to pay the 2010 adjusted rents in a reasonable time would give rise to an
action for breach of contract, Judge Brown expressly reserved to PMC the right to pursue a new
claim for breach of contract should Quail Ridge fail to perform under the contract as outlined by him.
Section 26 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, addresses this issue and provides a
list of exceptions for when splitting trials is permissible, although such is generally unfavored under
the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel:
(1) When any of the following circumstances exist, the general rule of§ 24
does not apply to extinguish the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as
a possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff against the defendant:

****
(b) The court in the first action has expressly reserved the plaintiffs
right to maintain the second action;

****
Restatement (Second) ofJudgments§ 26, Exceptions to the General Rule Concerning Splitting, at
(l)(b).
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Because Judge

expressly reserved to PMC the right to pursue a breach
to

the

contract

l 0 adjusted rents within a reasonable time, the present

case is not extinguished by the directed verdict granted by Judge Brown in the first action.
Furthermore, this Court should find that PMC was simply doing what it was directed by the Plv!C
I court to do

the event that Quail Ridge failed to perform under the terms of the parties' Ground

Lease once Judge Brown declared the adjusted rents for the 2010 Rent Adjustment Period. Finally,
this Court should find that where Judge Brown expressly reserved to PMC the right to bring this
second action for breach of contract should Quail Ridge fail to perform under the terms of the Lease
Agreement, then the second action is not barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral
estoppel. Such a holding would be consistent with Section 26( 1)(b) of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments, which should be adopted by this Court. ln so finding, this Court should affirm on appeal
the judgment of the district court.

F.

Preston is a Proper Party to this Action.

The district court did not err when it granted judgment against both Quail Ridge and Preston.
There is no genuine issue of material fact in this case that the Guarantee executed by Preston on June
1, 2001, obligated him to pay the adjusted rents declared by Judge Brown when Quail Ridge failed
to do so. Similarly, there is no genuine issue of material fact or question oflaw in this case that once
Judge Brown determined the 2010 adjusted rents, Quail Ridge and Preston were both obligated to
promptly pay such adjusted rents under the terms ofthe parties Lease Agreement and under the terms
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Preston's Guarantee.
legal reasons outlined

Sections C, D, and E supra of the Respondent Brief, the

doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel did not bar PMC from bringing this present action
against not only Quail Ridge but also against Preston.

Because the present action was not

extinguished by the prior action, PMC was within its rights to sue Preston for his failure to perform
under the terms of his Guarantee once Quail Ridge failed to promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents.
The district court correctly found that there were no genuine issues of material fact in this
case and that judgment in favor of PMC and against both Quail Ridge and Preston was appropriate
as a matter oflaw. Because the district court did not err in granting such summary judgment, the
district court should be aft1rmed by this Court on appeal.
G.

The District Court Did not Err in Awarding Attorney's Fees and Costs to PM C.

In Idaho lvfilitary Historical Society, Inc. v. Maslen, No. 39909, 2014 WL 2735320 (Boise,
December 2013 Term), this Court articulated the following standard of review relevant to the grant
of attorneys fees under I.C. § 12-121 and I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l):
"A trial court's determination of whether a party prevailed is a matter of
discretion." Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho 425,434-45, 111 P.3d 110,
119-20 (2005). An award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-121 and
l.R.C.P. 54(e)(l) will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See
Saveage v. Lateral Ditch Water Users Ass'n v. Pulley, 125 Idaho 237,250,
869 P.2d 554, 567 (1993). The district court's determination as to whether
an action was brought or defended frivolously will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion. Anderson v. Ethington, 103 Idaho 658, 660, 651 P .2d
923,925 (1981).

Respondent Brief

Page 29

Soc

Inc. v. Maslen, No. 39909, 2014 WL 2735320, at *3 (Boise,

December 2013 Term).
This Court further found that when an exercise of discretion is involved, "this Court conducts
a three-step inquiry: ( l) whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the court reached is decision by the
exercise of reason." !d.
In the case at hand, application of the above standards sides in favor with the district court.
First, a review ofthe Judge Naftz' s Order Regarding Attorney Fees reveals that he clearly understood
and perceived that the issue of attorney fees was one of discretion. Indeed, in the opening line ofhis
analysis, Judge Naftz states: "Rule 54(e)(l) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure (IRCP) provides
a court with the discretion to award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party when authorized
by statute or contract." (R Vo. I, pp. 413-414) (emphasis added). Thus, there is no doubt in this
case that Judge Naftz properly perceived that this issue was a matter of discretion.
Next, there is ample evidence in this case that Judge Naftz acted within the outer boundaries
of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the choices before him.
Again, a review ofhis Order Regarding Attorney Fees demonstrates that Judge Naftz considered the
applicable rules and legal standards that were to guide his decision. For instance, in analyzing a
grant of attorneys fees under § 12-121, Judge Naftz found:
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\\M.~v,·r

even in cases where ''the losing party has asserted factual or legal
claims that are frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation", as long as
"there is a legitimate, triable issue offact or a legitimate issue
attorney
fees may not be awarded" under IC § 12-121.
(R Vo. 1, pp. 414-415)(citingA1cGrewv. JvfcGrew, 139 Idaho 551-562, 82 P.3d 833, 8844 (2003)).
Judge Naftz further recognized that ·'attorney fees may not be awarded under IC § 12-121 unless the
losing party's entire case is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation." (R Vo. 1, pp. 413-414)
(citing Vendelin v. Costco Wholelvale, Corp., 140 Idaho 416,434, 95 P.3d 34, 52 (2007)). These
citations as well as the other authority cited by Judge Naftz in his Order Regarding Attorney Fees
demonstrate that he correctly perceived and acted within the outer boundaries his discretion and
further acted consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before him.
Quail-Preston next contend that Judge Naftz's failure to cite to I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is somehow
fatal and is evidence of the fact that he did not consider these factors in determining whether PMC' s
requested attorney fees were reasonable. Such argument, however, is simply misguided.
With regard to a trial court's analysis of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, this Court has previously
stated:
Though it is not necessary for the court to address all of the LR. C.P. 54(e)(3)
factors in writing, the record must clearly indicate the court considered all of
the factors. However, the bottom line in an award of attornev's fees is
reasonableness.
Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,433, 196 P.3d 341, 351 (2008) (citations omitted). In this

case, although Judge Naftz did not place into writing his consideration of all the Rule 54(e)(3)
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factors,

ncr1TT"'"

decision does evidence that all such factors were considered. In

Order on

Attorney Fees, Judge Naftz stated:
Having thoroughly reviewed the Plaintiffs Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees and
supporting memorandum and affidavit, as well as taking into careful consideration the
Defendant's objections and the oral arguments presented at the hearing, this Court hereby
awards the Plaintiff the sum of $15,599.75 in attorney fees. This Court reduced the
Plaintiffs request for fees by S197.25.
(R Vol. 1, p. 416). Specifically, a review of the briefing on this motion and the hearing minutes in
this issue demonstrates that Quail-Preston's main challenge to the reasonableness ofPMC's request
for attorney fees was certain entries being claimed by PMC. (R Vol. 1, pp. 405-409) (Tr Hr' g on
December 16, 2013, at 11 :22 - 14:21 ). The above-cited language demonstrates that Judge Naftz
specifically took the disputed entries into consideration and adjusted PMC 's claim for attorney fees
accordingly.
Given the totality of this record evidence, there can be no doubt that Judge Naftz exercised
reason in exercising his discretion to award attorney fees in this case. He further exercises reason
in determining the appropriate amount of attorney fees to award. In fact, Judge Naftz even adjusted
PMC's attorney fees based upon issues raised by Quail-Preston's attorneys. Thus, the amount of
attorney fees awarded in this case was reasonable under the facts and circumstances of the case.
With regard to the district court's award of discretionary costs to PMC, the same three-step
inquiry as above-outlined is required: "( 1) whether the trial court properly perceived the issue as one
of discretion; (2) whether that court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
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consistently with
reached is decision

applicable to specific
the

,. Idaho

(3) whether the court
14

2735320,

at *3.
In this case, Judge Naftz's Order Regarding Attorney Fees demonstrates that Judge Naftz
understood and perceived that the issue of costs was also one of discretion for him. Furthermore,
a review ofhis decision demonstrates that Judge Naftz understood the boundaries of such discretion
as guided by the legal standards applicable to the specific choice before him. Indeed, in this regard,
Judge Naftz noted that, while the awarding of such costs is discretionary, "'the burden is on the
prevailing party to make an adequate initial showing that these costs were necessary and exceptional
and reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse party."
(R Vol. 1, p. 418)( citing Wesifall v. Catepillar, Inc., 120 Idaho 918,926,821 P.2d 973, 981 (1991)).
Judge Naftz further found that, under Rule 54(d)(l)(D), he was required to make •·express findings
as to why each discretionary costs item should or should not be allowed:' (R Vol. 1, p. 418). These
citations as well as the other citations contained within the court's Order Regarding Attorney Fees
demonstrates that Judge Naftz acted within the outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently
with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices before him.
As to whether his decision was reached by the exercise of reason, Judge Naftz states within
his Order on Attorney Fees:
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Plaintiffs memorandum and considering the arguments
opposition presented by the Defendant,
Court has determined the
costs
this matter were a necessary and reasonable
part ofthis case. This Court has also determined these were exceptional costs
reasonably incurred.
(R Vol. 1, p. 419). The above language demonstrates that Judge Naftz exercised reason in reaching
his decision to award and grant PMC these exceptional costs. This language also shows that Judge
Naftz considered all arguments on the issue prior to reaching a decision. It is clear from this
language that Judge Naftz certainly understood that he had discretion to act in this circumstance and
he did not act until he had fairly and fully considered all arguments for and against the awarding of
these exceptional costs. After considering these arguments, Judge Naftz recognized that he had
discretion to grant these research costs and determined that such costs "were a necessary and
reasonable part of this case" that were '·exceptional costs reasonably incurred."
Judge Naftz was well within his discretion in this case to award costs and attorney fees to

8

Which was the same arguments and case law that Quail-Preston raise in this appeal. Namely

citing to one Federal bankruptcy court case for the proposition that legal research is a routine cost that
are part of the overhead of running a law firm. This argument, however, fails to recognize the reality that
it is not an uncommon practice for smaller law firms in rural communities, like Pocatello, Idaho, to pass

part of this costs onto their clients. This is what happened in this case. Indeed, the records in this case
demonstrate that Judge Brown was aware that this expense was passed on to and paid by PMC long prior
to PMC's motion for costs and attorney fees. (Tr Hr'g on December 16,2013, pp. 14:22- 16:22) (R Vol.
1, pp. 346-52). Frankly, if Quail-Preston had simply posted the bond necessary to secure the stay
previously granted by the district court, these legal research expenses could have possibly been avoided
because the matter would have been stayed pending this Court's decision in PJ;[C I.
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PMC as the
appeal absent

His use of discretion to do so should not be
of such discretion. Quail-Preston

Court on
not presented

any evidence of an abuse of discretion by the district court in this case and, therefore, Judge Naftz' s
award of these costs and attorneys fees should be affirmed by this Court on appeal.
Furthermore, this Court should recognize that Judge Naftz did not award attorneys fees on
the basis ofLC. § 12-121 alone. Rather, Judge Naftz's Order makes it clear that P:Y1C was entitled
to attorney fees and costs as the prevailing party pursuant to Section 10.3 of the parties' Lease
Agreement. Notably, Quail-Preston has not challenged this legal basis for Judge Naftz's award of
attorneys fees in this case and, therefore, they have waived this argument now on appeal. See lvfyers
v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 140 Idaho 495, 508, 95 P.3d 977, 990 (2004) (finding that '''this Court

will not consider arguments raised for the first time in the appellant's reply brief."') (citing State v.
Killinger, 126 Idaho 737, 740, 890 P.2d 323, 326 (1995)).

Similarly, Quail-Preston has not

challenged the district court's award of costs that were a matter of right pursuant to I.R.C.P.
54( d)( I )(C). Thus, even if this Court were to determine that attorney fees and costs as a matter of
right should not have been granted under I.C. 12-121, this Court should find that the court's error
is not reversible because the Court appropriately awarded such costs and fees under the parties'
contract. l.R. C. P. 54(e)(1) provided the court with the necessary discretion to award attorney fees
to PMC as the prevailing party when so authorized by contract. Similarly, LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(c)
provided the court with discretion to award costs to PMC as the prevailing party under these same
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this
to mandatory costs and attorney

should find that any error claimed
is not reversible error

Quail-Preston with regard

therefore, affirm

courts

award of mandatory costs and attorney fees on appeal. This Court should further find that the district
court had discretion to grant discretionary costs under the facts of this case and that it did not abuse
its discretion in so doing. As such, this Court should affirm Judge Nafta's full grant of costs and
attorney fees in this case and affirm the district court's decision in this regard.
H.

P::\'iC is Entitled to Attorney Fees on Appeal.

If the court affirms the district court on appeal, then PMC will be the prevailing party on
appeal. The entire case will then be disposed of and there will be nothing left to litigate on remand.
PMC wilL therefore, be the overall prevailing party in a claim involving a commercial transaction.
PMC will further have prevailed on an appeal involving a contract with an attorney fees and costs
provision. Therefore, this Court should award PMC attorney fees and costs associated with
responding to this appeal.
Idaho Code Section

120(3) provides for attorney fees for the prevailing party in a

commercial transaction. Idaho Code § 1 120(3 ). Section 12-120(3) is clear in its definition of a
commercial transaction: " . . . all transactions except transactions for personal or household
purposes." ld.

This suit concerns a commercial lease agreement and has nothing to do with

personal or household purposes. Attorney fees must be awarded in this case pursuant to 12-120(3)
because this case involves a commercial lease. See, e.g. Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 986 P.2d
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101

133 Idaho 353 (1999)

landlord was entitled to

farmer who prevailed in breach
fees pursuant to I.C.

contract action against

12-120(3)); and,

V.

Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 900 P.2d 201 (1995) (lease dispute concerning operation of cattle ranch
upon which neither party maintained a home was "commercial transaction" under I. C. § 12-120(3)).
If the district court is affirmed on appeal, this Court should find that PMC is the overall prevailing
party in a commercial transaction and, therefore, is entitled to an award of attorneys fees pursuant
to I.C. § 12-120(3).
Additionally, this Court should recognize that the parties' Lease Agreement provides that the
prevailing party is entitled to an award of costs and attorneys fees:
10.3 Attorney's Fees. In the event suit shall be brought for an unlawful
detainer of the said premises, for the recoverv of any rent due under the
provisions of this lease, or breach of a covenant herein contained to be kept
or performed, the prevailing party shall be paid a reasonable attorney's fee by
the other party, and such attorney's fee shall be deemed to have accrued at the
commencement of such action and shall be paid whether or not such action
is prosecuted to judgment.
(R Vol. 1, p. 385). There can be no doubt that PMC should be awarded attorney fees pursuant to this
section of the Lease Agreement if the district court is affirmed on appeal because this breach of
contract action is for the recovery of rent due under the provision of this Lease Agreement. As such,
this Court should award PMC its costs and attorney fees associated with this appeal if the Court
affirms the decision of the district court in granting summary judgment in favor of this Plaintiff.
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Because PMC, as
pursuant to

35(b)(5)

has asserted this claim as an issue presented on appeal
4l(a),

fees for this

appeal as the prevailing party.

IV.

CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

Based upon the foregoing arguments, PMC respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
decisions of the district court and affirm the Amended Final Judgment entered by the district court.
This Court should find that the district court did not err by refusing to apply the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel to the facts of this case because: ( 1) PMC' s current breach of contract
claim is not barred by these doctrines because it was not ripe in Pit1C I and did not become ripe until
after Judge Brown entered his Declaratory Judgment in that action and Quail Ridge and Preston
thereafter failed to promptly pay the rents so adjusted; {2) Judge Brown's Declaratory Judgment in
Pi\rfC J and Quail Ridge and Preston's failure to promptly pay thereafter created a change in

circumstances and a new set of facts which is a recognized exception to these doctrines; or, {3) Judge
Brown expressly reserved to PMC in the first action the right to pursue the second action should
Quail Ridge fail to promptly pay the 2010 adjusted rents. This Court should adopt Section 26(1 )(b)
of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments and find that where a prior court has expressly reserved
the right of a plaintiff in a first action to pursue a second action, then the second action is not barred
by the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel.
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This Court should also affirm the district court's grant of

fees

should award

and reasonable attorneys fees and costs on appeal as the overall prevailing party to
action as set forth in Section IILG supra.
DATED this

of June, 2014.
MERRILL & MERRILL CHARTERED

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned attorney for the Plaintiff Respondent in the above-referenced matter does
hereby certify that two true, full and correct copies of the foregoing document was this

day of

June, 2014, served upon the following in the manner indicated below:

Michael Gaffney
John Avondet
BEARD ST. CLAIR GAFFNEY P A
2105 Coronado Street
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83404
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